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Abstract 
Empirical studies on the importance of social capital for poor households show divergent 
outcomes. This divergence may stem from the lack of a conceptual framework for capturing 
the social capital dimensions that deliver economic value to individuals. This paper defines 
individual social capital from an economic perspective and proposes a measurement based on 
the two dimensions of individual social capital that bring economic value to individuals, i.e. 
informal risk insurance arrangements and information advantages arising from personal social 
networks. Using this measurement, we present a numerical application to argue that differing 
network configurations drive asymmetry of social interactions among individuals. (102 
words)  
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The term social capital refers to the resources embedded in social ties between individuals. It 
facilitates economic transactions, especially in environments characterized by imperfect 
information and limited contract enforcement. According to Bourdieu (1986) individuals can 
build social capital through purposeful action and transform it into economic gain. A large 
body of the sociological literature defines social capital and explains its interaction with other 
forms of capital.1 Yet, economists have only recently considered social capital in their 
investigations of processes explaining (microeconomic) exchange and (macroeconomic) 
growth.2 Moreover, because researchers lack a suitable definition of the concept to carry out 
empirical economic investigations, they have used various proxies as measures. The 
multidimensionality of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998)3 has resulted in divergent 
views of its role in economic research. A conceptual framework is necessary to identify the 
dimensions of social capital from an economic perspective.  
To determine the dimensions of social capital that shape the economic behavior of 
individuals, the concept of individual social capital (as developed in the sociological 
literature) must be linked to theoretical and empirical evidence of the economic value of 
social interaction for individuals. Such a link may allow future empirical researchers to 
include relevant individual social capital dimensions in their analyses and enhance 
understanding of the economic role of individual social capital. This can help individuals and 
organizations leverage the economic outcomes of social interactions. By identifying the 
dimensions of social interaction that make such connections valuable to individuals, 
organizations can develop more focused human resource services for their employees and 
stimulate the accumulation of social capital—thereby improving cooperation between 
employees. Furthermore, when individuals understand the incentives associated with social 
interaction, they can take a more focused approach to establishing social ties.  
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One potentially interesting application of our approach relates to improving our 
understanding of the persistence of poverty and inequality in developing societies. These 
societies are characterized by environments in which imperfect information, underdeveloped 
or non-existent formal institutions and limited contract enforcement play an important role. 
Consequently, social capital may be important to facilitate economic transactions in these 
societies. If we understand how personal social networks create economic value, we can 
explain economic disparities between individuals as being partly driven by the differences in 
the use and mobilization of their individual stocks of social capital. Insights into how social 
capital brings economic value to individuals can help people thrive and inform policies that 
are focused on achieving bottom-up poverty alleviation.  
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap with respect to our understanding the economic 
value of social capital that currently exists in the literature. We begin by providing a concrete 
definition of individual social capital and identifying social capital dimensions that are 
important from an economic perspective (i.e., dimensions that bring economic value to the 
individual). Next, we develop a new conceptual framework around this definition and propose 
a social capital measurement. Finally, we apply this measurement numerically to demonstrate 
that differences in the network configurations between individuals lead to asymmetry of 
social interactions between these individuals.  
The setting in which we discuss our conceptual framework and develop our numerical 
example is primarily focusing on the poor in emerging societies, as the role of social capital in 
creating economic value is arguably most important in societies where imperfect information, 
un(der)developed formal institutions and limited contract enforcement abound. At the same 
time, however, we stress that our findings can be applied more generally to other institutional 
contexts as well. 
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We make two contributions to the existing literature on social capital. First, we bring 
together three different strands of literature to conceptualize individual social capital from an 
economic perspective. Specifically, we propose a measurement of resources embedded in 
social ties along the two social capital dimensions that bring economic value to individuals. 
The second contribution is the finding that the exchange of resources between two individuals 
is affected by their individual network configurations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses three strands 
of literature to define individual social capital from an economic perspective. Section 3 
proposes a measurement for the individual social capital. Section 4 provides an application of 
this measurement through a numerical example, which reveals that various network 
configurations drive asymmetrical social interactions. Section 5 presents conclusions.  
 
2. Conceptualization of Social Capital 
In this section, we conceptualize social capital by reviewing three strands of literature. We 
begin by defining the concept of social capital according to the mainstream sociological 
literature. Next, we introduce two theories on how social capital brings economic value to 
individuals. The first theory pertains to how social ties are used as informal risk insurance 
devices and the second explains the role of social ties in information diffusion. Finally, we 
provide a concrete definition for social capital from an economic perspective. 
 
2.1. Social Capital: Concepts and Definitions 
The concept of social capital has been defined in the mainstream sociological literature from a 
network-based perspective. That is, it refers to the resources embedded in social networks.4 
Social networks are patterns of social exchange and interaction that persist over time (Uphoff, 
2000). The links between network members are known as social ties. Social ties have 
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differing strengths, varying from weak ties (e.g., acquaintances) to strong ties (e.g., family 
members or very close friends). Granovetter (1973) defines the strength of a tie as a 
combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confidence), and 
reciprocal services between two individuals.  
In investigating social ties within a community, Granovetter (1973, 1983) finds that 
strong social ties are not spread among social networks at the community level but are 
organized into tightly knit clusters. Lin (1986) extends this finding by identifying patterns in 
which social ties of different strengths are grouped or clustered within networks. He identifies 
three network layers. The first (inner) layer is formed by densely knit, strong ties. Individuals 
linked by these ties (usually kin members or close friends) have intense interactions and feel 
obligated to reciprocate and provide mutual support. The social capital embedded in this 
network layer is known as binding social capital. 
A second (intermediary) layer consists of a mixture of strong and weak ties and is 
wrapped around this tightly knit cluster of strong ties. Some members of the first network 
layer have strong ties with other individuals beyond their tightly knit cluster of strong ties; 
others do not. However, individuals who limit their strong ties to the first network layer are 
linked via weak ties to the individuals to whom their first network layer peers are connected 
via strong ties. In other words, individuals from the first layer do not maintain equally strong 
and reciprocal relations with the individuals from the second layer. The social capital 
embedded in the ties from the second network layer is known in sociology as bonding social 
capital. Although the second-network-layer individuals are not bound to equally reciprocate 
and provide support to the first-network-layer members, they all belong to the same network 
segment (in which all individuals know each other). 
The third (outer) layer refers to the entire community, which provides members with a 
sense of belonging, even though they may not interact directly. When ties with the third 
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network layer exist, they are always weak. However, they offer the possibility of diversifying 
social capital through access to other network segments. Diversity of social capital reflects the 
variety of resources that individuals can access. Such diversity is important because it 
increases the range of opportunities for individuals. Because these ties link individuals from 
different network segments, the social capital they embed is called bridging social capital.  
We restructure these concepts to present the three network layers from the perspective 
of the individual, rather than from tie clusters within the community. Figure 1a illustrates the 
example of the social network of individual “a”. In this figure, we portray a community, N, 
made up of seven individuals N = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}. To facilitate the explanation, let us 
consider the ties represented in this figure either as strong (represented by a full line) or weak 
(represented by a dotted line). Individuals b and c form the first social capital layer of a, 
because they are a’s strong ties.  
Note that when observing another individual from community N, the structures of 
individuals’ social networks and, thus, the distribution of the three network layers, may be 
different. Taking individual b for example (see Figure 1b), b’s first layer is formed by ties 
with a, c, and d; those ties are b’s strong ties. We can imagine that in Figure 1b, a, b, and c are 
members of the same family, and b also has a close friend d, who is also a close friend of c, 
but not a. Note that the tie between a and d is weak.  
We return to the structure of the network from the perspective of individual a shown 
in Figure 1a. To maintain simplicity, in the second layer of this figure we consider a single 
individual d. The individual d is positioned on the second layer of a because d is part of the 
same network segment as a (whose social network we are examining), and a and d are linked 
by a weak tie. Individuals from the first layer may be linked by strong or weak ties to 
individuals from the second layer (in our example, b and c are linked by strong ties with d). 
As Lin (1986) argues, this leads to a mixture of strong and weak ties between individuals 
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from the first network layer and the second network layer. In other words, from an 
individual’s perspective, the second network layer is determined by the weak ties of the 
individual whose network we are examining with individuals from the same network segment.  
The third layer is formed by individuals e, f, and g. Individuals from the first and 
second network layer may or may not be linked to individuals from the third network layer. 
When these links are present, they are weak. These individuals are not linked with a, c, and d. 
The social capital of a, c and d is limited to social ties with individuals from the same network 
segment. However, there is a bridge (i.e., a weak tie between individuals from different 
network segments) between b and e.  
 
2.2. The Economic Value of Social Capital 
Two strands of literature investigate the use of social ties in economic actions. The first 
argues that individuals use their social ties as informal risk insurance devices. The second 
assumes that social ties are used for information diffusion purposes. An individual’s decision-
making process is likely to be affected by the availability and accuracy of information and by 
the individual’s exposure to risk. Thus, information availability and risk insurance shape the 
economic performance of individuals.  
Poor individuals live in soft-information-based environments.5 To collect soft 
information and thus make informed decisions, they rely heavily on their social ties. 
Moreover, missing or unreliable formal institutions (e.g., formal social security systems) and 
lack of access to resources compel these individuals to turn to their social networks to insure 
against risks. For poor individuals, these informal risk insurance arrangements play a critical 





2.2.1 Social Capital as an Informal Risk Insurance Device 
A large part of the literature focuses on informal insurance in social networks. Informal 
insurance is regarded as a social activity in which transfers are based mainly on social norms 
of reciprocity (Platteau, 2000). Enforcement is a critical aspect of informal risk insurance 
arrangements. There are two perspectives on enforcement. First, a self-enforcing element is 
embedded in these arrangements. Individuals willingly make transfers toward members of 
their informal risk insurance arrangements to maintain the arrangements because they may 
need them in cases of future shocks. Second, there is third-party enforcement for deviating 
members (i.e. members who decide not to make transfers toward an affected peer). Other 
members of the informal risk insurance arrangement may punish deviating members by 
excluding them from the arrangement.  
The main findings of research on informal risk insurance indicate that these informal 
arrangements do not take place at the community or village level. Instead, they occur within 
smaller network segments involving individuals linked by strong ties, i.e. individuals in the  
first network layer (see, e.g., Fafchamps, 1992, Grimmard, 1997, Murgai et al., 2002, 
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003, De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006, Angelucci et al., 2015). The 
strength of ties reflects the willingness of individuals to step in and help each other in cases of 
need. As Figure 2 illustrates, first-network-layer ties are links with individuals who are 
willing to redirect their resources to the affected individual, thus providing an informal risk 
insurance arrangement.  
The extent to which binding ties are able to help an individual overcoming an 
idiosyncratic shock depends on the capacity of the ties to produce and provide resources. 
Individuals who live in resource-scarce environments are usually more exposed to shocks. 
This exposure incentivizes them to exchange resources in non-crisis conditions to establish 
and maintain informal risk insurance arrangements that will support them in cases of 
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idiosyncratic shocks. The extent to which two individuals are able to provide resources to 
each other in non-crisis conditions may affect their decisions to maintain or adjust the current 
strength of their dyadic tie. The decision to exchange resources with an individual who has a 
greater ability to reciprocate may improve the payoff of one’s network. 
Several studies examine the formation of informal risk insurance arrangements and 
show individuals make independent decisions on forming and reshaping their informal risk 
insurance arrangements (see, e.g., Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Grimmard, 1997; Comola, 
2007). Usually, they do not create risk-sharing groups. Instead, individuals form bilateral risk-
sharing relationships (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007).  
The functioning of informal risk insurance arrangements and potential decisions to 
reshape them are contingent on the availability of information. Information may help 
individuals to verify whether an idiosyncratic shock has happened to a member of one’s 
informal risk insurance arrangement and allow them to monitor the use of resources provided 
by the arrangement. Conversely, affected individuals may verify whether members of their 
informal risk insurance arrangements have provided resources according to their ability to 
contribute. Moreover, other contributing members from the arrangement may collect 
information to check whether all expected contributors have provided their support. Further 
network-reshaping decisions are taken based on availability and accuracy of information. 
 
2.2.2. Social Ties for Information Diffusion Purposes 
Individuals communicate during their social interactions to exchange information. 
Information diffusion is a special type of communication, in which messages are associated 
with new information (Rogers, 2003). This new information results in broadening of 
knowledge and opportunities (Granovetter, 1983). The ability of personal networks to diffuse 
information is essential for individuals to have access to new opportunities; it enables them to 
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make informed decisions. A wide range of economic studies acknowledges the importance of 
access to new information. Jackson and Yariv (2010) provide an overview of how information 
diffusion influences individuals’ behaviors. The extent to which individuals get access to new 
information depends on the diffusion capacity of their dyadic ties. Although strong ties 
determine the extent to which asset-poor individuals may be able to deal with idiosyncratic 
shocks, they have little effect from an information diffusion perspective. Strong ties provide 
access to limited and redundant information (Granovetter, 1983; Lin, 1986). Figure 2 shows 
that information exchanged by individuals a, b, and c is highly redundant because as 
explained by Granovetter they spend a great amount of time together in the same 
environment, sharing the same experiences.  
We find that an individual’s ties with the second network layer (i.e., the tie between a 
and d) give access to limited and largely redundant information. This occurs because a and d 
are part of the same network segment. Information available to d is likely to be have been 
already transmitted to a through other channels (e.g., through b and c). Only bridging ties 
(i.e., weak ties linking individuals from different network segments) facilitate access to new 
and non-redundant information (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Lin, 1986). In our example, b is the 
only individual in the network segment with a bridging tie (with individual e). This gives b an 
information advantage within b’s network segment because b can access new information that 
is otherwise unavailable. Figure 2 illustrates the way information is diffused across the three 
network layers.  
 
2.3. Social Capital: A New Definition 




Individual social capital refers to whom you know, what information advantage those 
you know can provide, and the extent to which they are willing and able to help you in 
cases of need. 
 
This definition encompasses the two dimensions in which social capital shapes the economic 
behavior of individuals: (1) the information advantage that members of an individual’s social 
network can bring and (2) the individual’s informal risk insurance arrangement (i.e., to what 
extent social network members are both willing and able to help one in cases of need). The 
aim of the next section is to provide an individual social capital measurement by building on 
this definition. 
 
3. Social Capital Measurement 
Using the definition discussed in section 2.3 we examine individual social capital from the 
perspective of (1) informal risk insurance arrangements and (2) information advantages. In 
particular, we provide a way to measure the individual social capital along these two 
dimensions.  
 
3.1. Informal Risk Insurance Arrangement 
As noted, we can identify the capacity of a dyadic tie to act as an informal risk insurance 
device by examining the extent to which the two individuals are willing to help each other 
(i.e., the strength of their dyadic tie) and the extent to which they are able to provide help or 
resources in cases of need (i.e., the content of the dyadic tie). These two aspects of social ties 
are complementary: the content of a tie shows the total amount of resources the tie could 
possibly provide at a certain moment, and its strength shows the extent to which one 
individual allows the other to transform these resources into personal assets. 
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Let us consider a community, N, where  denotes the strength of the dyadic tie 
between individuals i and j, ranging between 0 (no tie) and 1 (very strong tie); that is, 
0 ≤  ≤ 1. Although  shows the current willingness of i to help j if an idiosyncratic 
shock happens to j, this willingness is the result of multiple social interactions over time. In 
line with Granovetter’s definition, the strength of i’s dyadic tie with j is a function of the 
amount of time they have spent together, the emotional intensity and intimacy (mutual 
confidence) that i assigns to the relationship with j, and the services they have exchanged in 
the past. Although the amount of time the two individuals have spent together is implicitly 
symmetrical, they may not perceive their relationship with the same emotional intensity and 
intimacy. Moreover, the value the two individuals assign to past exchanges of pecuniary 
resources may differ. Thus, in reality, the strength of a dyadic tie may not be symmetrical. For 
the sake of simplicity, however, we will assume that the strength of dyadic ties is symmetrical 
(see section 4).6  
With regard to the content of dyadic ties, let 	denote the redistributable monetized 
resources that individual i is currently able to share with i’s network. Redistributable 
resources pertain to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary resources that i is able to share with 
other network members after satisfying his/her personal needs (in terms of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary consumption as well as any desired savings). The individual i thus retains a share of 
personal resources and distributes the remainder within the network.  
The strength of a tie is a matter of personal perception that the individual has 
developed from past social interactions. The content of a tie refers to the resources the 
individual is able to redistribute between the members of the individual’s network. 
Developing and maintaining strong social ties is time-consuming and costly. To maintain 
binding ties that can be used as risk-coping devices in case of idiosyncratic shock, network 
members exchange resources during non-crisis situations. This prevents waste of perishable 
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resources (e.g., food), helps smoothing consumption, and provides social support (e.g., time 
spent together, advice, moral support). Thus, we assume that in non-crisis situations, each 
individual distributes personal redistributable resources to other network members according 
to the strengths of the individual’s dyadic ties. Thus, the resources that i gives to j in non-
crisis situations, 	, are: 
 
	 = ∑ 

∗ .                                                                                                                (1) 
 
Equation (1) shows the resources that i gives to j in non-crisis situations are directly 
proportional to the strength of their dyadic tie and to i’s current stock of redistributable 
resources, and inversely proportional to the sum of the strengths of all i’s dyadic ties. This 
implies that the resources j receives from i in non-crisis conditions depend not only on  and 
the resources that remain available to i after satisfying personal needs, but also on the 
configuration of i’s network (in terms of the number and strengths of i’s dyadic ties). 
Therefore, there is asymmetry in terms of resources exchanged by the two individuals due to 
three factors. First, as Granovetter’s definition indicates, the strength of dyadic ties is 
asymmetrical. That is, individuals do not invest identical emotional intensity and intimacy in 
their dyadic tie and may not assign identical value to their past pecuniary exchanges. Second, 
at any moment in time, individuals may not have identical stocks of redistributable resources. 
Third, the resources one individual gives to the other in non-crisis situations depend on the 
first individual’s network configuration (in terms of the number and strength of dyadic ties). 
As Figures 1a and 1b in Section 2 illustrate, individuals may have different network 
configurations.  
Although literature has addressed the asymmetry of dyadic ties, scant research has 
examined how the network configuration of individuals in a community affects the payoff that 
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results from an individual’s personal dyadic ties. To this end, in Section 4, we numerically 
apply the measurement proposed in Section 3 to explain how the various network 
configurations of individuals from community N determine their asymmetrical social 
interactions.  
Building on Equation (1), the resources made available (AR) by the community to 
individual j, are: 
 
 = ∑ 	.

                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
In other words, j receives—from the community—the resources the community members can 
provide to j. As Equation (1) indicates, these resources depend on the community members’ 
personal stocks of redistributable resources, the strengths of their dyadic ties with j, and their 
personal network configurations (in terms of number and strength of dyadic ties). 
However, in a crisis situation (i.e., idiosyncratic shock), the informal risk insurance 
arrangement is fully enabled. If a major shock occurs, the affected individual may need the 
entire stock of redistributable network resources available to overcome the shock. The 
members of the individual’s informal risk insurance arrangement are those willing to redirect 
their stocks of redistributable resources to the individual. Each member of the informal risk 
insurance arrangement is driven to maintain the current strength of the tie with the affected 
individual, because the tie has been costly to establish. Furthermore, members are motivated 
by reciprocity: they may themselves at some point in time need the resources of the supported 
individual. This incentivizes them to put pressure on deviant (non-supporting) members of the 
informal risk insurance arrangement to help with resources the affected individual. This is 
because if the affected individual fails to receive enough support to overcome the shock, the 
entire informal risk insurance device will be affected. Not only will deviant (i.e. non-
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supporting) individuals lose expected future reciprocity from the affected individual, other 
members will also suffer because the affected individual will not be able to reciprocate as 
expected. By failing to overcome the shock, the individual falls into deeper poverty and has 
less redistributable resources to share.  
Social ties that are part of informal risk insurance arrangements are strong ties that 
bind individuals to make reciprocal transfers and provide full support in cases of need (i.e. ties 
that form the individual’s first network layer, as described in Section 2). Only strong ties 
compel individuals to direct their redistributable resources toward an affected individual. To 
measure the total stock of redistributable resources that an individual’s informal risk 
insurance arrangement is able to provide in case of idiosyncratic shock, let us consider a 
threshold, , above which individual i deems dyadic ties as binding. In other words, i sees the 
ties having a strength lower than threshold  as part of i’s second or third network layer. 
Thus, the informal risk insurance arrangement, RI, of individual j is: 
 
  = ∑ 	Π!" ,                                                                                                     (3a) 
  
where Π!" =	 #1 if	 ≥ 0 otherwise.            (3b) 
 
Equation (3a) shows the amount of resources that members of j’s informal risk insurance 
arrangement are able to provide to j in case of idiosyncratic shock. As mentioned previously, 
when necessary to ensure that j will overcome the shock, the entire stock of redistributable 
resources in the possession of the members of j’s informal risk insurance arrangement are 
directed toward j. In other words,   shows the extent to which j is informally insured 




3.2. Information Advantage 
Poor individuals rely on their informal risk insurance arrangements to cope with idiosyncratic 
shocks. However, as discussed in section 2 they may also have access to new information 
beyond their network segment (i.e. their first- and second-network-layers, consisting of direct 
and indirect strong ties only) via bridging ties that can help them prevent shocks and improve 
their livelihoods. This information advantage is valuable because it can lead to opportunities 
that are unavailable in the individual’s network segment. 
The information advantage refers to access to new and non-redundant information via 
bridging ties. To measure an individual’s information advantage, we define a matrix for 
bridging ties . = /01, where 0 ∈ {0,1}. When 0 = 1, individuals i and j are linked by a 
bridging tie. When 0 = 0, the dyadic tie between i and j is absent, bonding, or binding. We 
assume γ to be the payoff/utility of the information diffused by j to i. An individual’s 
information advantage (IA) is the following: 
 
 6 = ∑ γ

Π7 .           (4) 
 
Equation (4) shows the information advantage of individual i, that is, the payoff/utility of the 
information that i receives from bridging ties. To establish and maintain bridging ties, 
individuals need to divert part of their redistributable resources toward them. This suggests 
that in a resource-scarce environment, bridging ties may not be a priority. Because asset-poor 
individuals are more exposed to shocks and do not usually have access to formal risk 
insurance schemes, they are compelled to invest their resources according to the priorities of 
building and maintaining their informal risk insurance arrangements, rather than improving 
their access to new information. This argument is supported by Granovetter (1983), who 
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builds on the work of Boorman (1975) to argue that strategies of social network expansion via 
weak ties usually belong to individuals who live in low-risk environments (i.e., the less poor).  
 
4. Applying the New Social Capital Measurement: Taking into Account Individuals’ 
Network Configurations 
Let us consider a resource-scarce community N, with no access to outside credit, in which 
aggregate consumption cannot exceed aggregate income.7 Individuals are risk-averse and may 
face idiosyncratic shocks. As denoted previously,  is the strength of the dyadic tie between 
individuals i and j; it can vary from 0 (no tie) to 1 (very strong tie), that is, 0 ≤  ≤ 1; 
	denotes the resources that individual i is currently able to redistribute within i’s network. 
To show how differing network configurations determine asymmetry of social interactions, 
we make the following three assumptions to endogenize the other dimensions of individual 
social capital measurement (i.e., the strength of ties between two individuals, individuals’ 
stocks of redistributable resources, and the strength beyond which a tie is expected to act as an 
informal risk insurance device): 
 
Assumption 1: The strength of dyadic ties is symmetrical:  = .  
 
Individuals assign the same strength to their dyadic tie. Thus, if as a function of past social 
interaction individual i regards j as a friend, j also regards i as a friend, with the same intensity 
of the relationship.  
 





This assumption is necessary to allow us to infer that the resulting asymmetry is due to the 
configurations of individuals’ networks, rather than their varying stocks of redistributable 
resources. 
 
Assumption 3: All individuals within a community agree on the value of the threshold T. 
 
If individual i regards the strength of the dyadic tie with j as above this threshold, thus 
qualifying it to be part of own informal risk insurance arrangement (i.e.,  is binding), j also 
regards the tie with i to be part of own informal risk insurance arrangement (i.e.,  is 
binding). Moreover, other network members also perceive  as binding, thus expecting the 
two individuals to help each other in case of idiosyncratic shock.  
In Figure 3, starting with these three assumptions, we consider the network example of 
individuals from community N, where the monetized redistributable resources of each 
individual are displayed in brackets beside the respective individual. Following Assumption 2, 
and as Figure 3 shows, the number of monetized redistributable resources for all individuals is 
80 units. The strength of the dyadic ties is displayed next to the respective ties between two 
individuals. Note that the strength of a tie lies between 0 (no tie) and 1 (very strong tie). As 
Figure 3 shows, the strength of the tie between individuals a and b is 1. In community N, the 
threshold, T, is assumed to be 0.5 and all ties with strengths higher than 0.5 are regarded as 
binding and expected to act as informal risk insurance devices. Thus, the dotted lines 
represent weak ties that do not act as informal risk insurance devices.  
 Table 1 presents the values for the resources available to each individual from 
community N in non-crisis situations (AR), and in case of idiosyncratic shock (RI).  
 The calculations in Table 1 are based on the numerical example presented in Figure 3, 
by applying the measurement presented in Section 3 in Equations (1) to (3). The exact 
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calculations related to the example given in Figure 3 for individual a from community N 
appear in Annex 1.  
 The first column of Table 1 displays the individuals from community N. The second 
column displays the individuals’ current amounts of redistributable resources (i.e., the values 
presented in Figure 3 beside the individuals). The third column displays computations of the 
resources the individual receives from the community in non-crisis situations. These 
computations are carried out on the basis of Equation (2) in Section 3.1. For example, the 
resources individual a receives from the dyadic tie with b are directly proportional to the 
strength of b’s dyadic tie with a, and b’s stock of redistributable resources, and inversely 
proportional to the sum of the strengths of all of b’s dyadic ties.8 A comparison of the second 
and third columns shows that the current network configuration leads to a net loss of 
resources for some individuals, such as a and d, who distribute more resources within the 
network than they receive. To explain why this happens, Table 2 displays the detailed 
exchanges made by any two individuals within the community. These calculations are based 
on Equation (1) in Section 3, according to the aforementioned assumptions.  
 The first row in Table 2 shows the resources individual a provides to the other 
members of the community. The first column shows the resources a receives from members 
who share a strong tie with a. The remaining rows and columns are interpreted in a similar 
way for the other members of the community. The figures show different individual network 
configurations determine the asymmetrical interaction and exchange of resources between 
individuals. For example, a provides 34.78 units of monetized resources to b, whereas b 
provides 26.67 units of monetized resources to a. According to the assumptions, the two 
individuals have a tie of symmetrical strength and possess an identical amount of 
redistributable resources (i.e. 80 units). Thus, the asymmetrical exchange of resources occurs 
because a distributes a stock of 80 units of redistributable resources between individuals b, c, 
20 
 
and d, according to their respective tie strengths of 1.0, 0.9, and 0.4 respectively. Individual b 
distributes the same stock of redistributable resources within a different network 
configuration. More precisely, b has ties with individuals a, c, d, and e of strengths 1.0, 0.9, 
0.8, and 0.3 respectively. Thus, the asymmetry in their current social interaction is determined 
by their differing network configurations.  
 The fourth column in Table 1 shows the total amount of resources on which the 
individual can rely in case of an idiosyncratic shock. The computations are based on Equation 
(3) in Section 3.1, taking into account the aforementioned assumptions. The results show the 
individuals from community N do not have the same informal insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks. That is, the community members do not have the same odds for overcoming an 
identical idiosyncratic shock. In case of failure to overcome a shock, the negative effects are 
not limited to the concerned individual, but extend to the other members of the informal risk 
insurance arrangement. Although these members have invested resources over time to build 
binding ties with the affected individual, that individual will no longer be able to reciprocate 
as expected. Because individuals’ informal risk insurance arrangements are bounded by the 
first layers of their social networks (see Section 2), the asymmetry between individual’s 
capacities to cope with identical idiosyncratic shocks is determined by the size of their first 
network layer. In other words, individuals’ capacities to cope with idiosyncratic shocks 
depend on the number of their binding ties, as well as on the content (i.e., the amount of 
redistributable resources) of those ties.  
 Bridging ties (see the tie between b and e) are of particular interest. Individual e does 
not bring any contribution to any individual forming b’s network segment, except to b. As 
discussed in Section 2, the bridging tie between b and e gives the two individuals access to 
new information, which may bring both of them new opportunities. However, part of the 
redistributable resources must be diverted toward this tie to maintain it at the current strength 
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(in the example from Figure 3, its strength is 0.3). These are resources that could have been 
otherwise diverted toward the members of b’s network segment. This may explain why, in 
some resource-scarce communities, there are social norms that bound the social interactions 
of individuals within their kinship or clique. The existence of pressure to compel the 
individual to develop relationships within the first two network layers is supported by both 
anecdotal and research evidence. For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) argue that 
arranged marriages in poor communities are designed to keep resources within the kinship.9 
 
5. Conclusions 
Social capital is a multidimensional concept. An individual’s stock of social capital refers to 
the resources embedded in the individual’s social network. Empirical studies have used 
various proxies to capture various dimensions of social capital, which may explain why 
research findings on the role of social capital diverge. To understand how personal social 
networks affect economic decisions, empirical economic researchers need to identify the 
dimensions of social capital that bring economic value to individuals. 
In this paper, we build on socioeconomic literature to define individual social capital 
from an economic perspective, and propose a measurement to identify the two dimensions of 
individual social capital that bring economic value to the individual: (1) informal risk 
insurance arrangements and (2) information advantages conferred by the social network. 
These two dimensions make social ties valuable for individuals, thus shaping their behavior.  
 Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we propose a concrete definition for 
individual social capital from an economic perspective and provide a measurement that 
identifies the two social capital dimensions that bring economic value to individuals. Future 
empirical researchers may use this approach to explain the role of individual social capital in 
shaping individual behavior. Second, the paper contributes to literature by indicating that 
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differing network configurations drive asymmetrical social interaction between individuals. 
Future empirical economic research should take into account individuals’ differing network 
positions (i.e., their differing network configurations) to explain their differing outcomes. 
 As discussed in the introduction, our approach may be especially relevant for 
understanding of the persistence of poverty and inequality in developing economies. These 
economies are characterized by environments in which imperfect information, 
underdeveloped or non-existent formal institutions and limited contract enforcement abound 
and where social capital may therefore be important to facilitate economic transactions. In 
particular, we see clear applications of our approach in better understanding and improving 
the use of microfinance programs. These programs aim at increasing access to financial 
services for poor households. Many of them use so-called group lending models in which the 
probability of repayment is increased by making all group members responsible for the loans 
provided to individual group members. The group lending model is based on the idea that 
these group members are willing and able to do so because of the social capital they share.10 
Increasing our knowledge of how social capital creates economic value may help improving 
the design of microfinance social-collateral-backed lending models to help individuals 
properly (and safely) exploit their stocks of social capital and access credit and other non-
financial services. 
The analysis in this paper may be extended in several ways. First, we have developed 
a conceptual framework. We did not derive a formal model. It may be worthwhile for 
researchers to model individual social capital accumulation starting from the  measurement 
suggested in this paper.  
Second, the conceptual framework is built on Lin’s (1986) notion of binding, bonding, 
and bridging ties. Thus, we do not differentiate between bridges to individuals from outside 
the community and bridges to individuals from within the community that are part of a 
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different network segment. The consequences of differentiating between these two types of 
bridging ties may be considered in future research, however.  
Third, in Section 4 we make three assumptions to show that asymmetrical social 
interactions are driven by differing network configurations. These assumptions are necessary 
to endogenize other factors that drive the asymmetry of social interaction, that is, the 
asymmetrical strengths of dyadic ties, the stock of redistributable resources of the two 
individuals, and different values of the threshold T. It may be worthwhile for researchers to 
discuss how these other factors affect the symmetry of individuals’ social interactions.  
Fourth, the numerical example in Section 4 we consider a closed community in which 
individuals have no access to outside credit so that aggregate consumption cannot exceed 
aggregate income. In this way, aggregate redistributable resources are not increased/decreased 
by unobserved factors outside the community (which would have been problematic to capture 
within the concrete numerical example). Yet, in reality individuals may have access to outside 
credit. This would result in higher (and unequal) access to resources, leading to increased 
asymmetries between individuals in terms of their capacities to cope with shocks, as well as 
their capacities to build and maintain personal networks. Future research may investigate the 
consequences of allowing individuals to have outside credit for the outcomes presented in the 
paper.  
Finally, our conceptual framework does not take power asymmetries between 
individuals into account. Such “patron–client” relationships may determine asymmetrical 
strengths of dyadic ties, asymmetries in terms of redistributable resources, and differing 
network configurations. While the model allows for such asymmetries, in the numerical 
example (Section 4) we assume the strengths of dyadic ties are symmetrical and individuals 
have the same stocks of redistributable resources. we make these assumptions to endogenize 
the measurement dimensions to ensure the asymmetry in social interactions between 
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individuals is the result of differing network configurations rather than factors such as 
asymmetrical strengths of ties, different stocks of redistributable resources, or even different 
values of the threshold T. Again, it may be interesting to analyze the consequences of 
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Below we explicitly describe the underlying theoretical formulas for individual a, example 
from Fig.3 
 
	89 = 8989 + 8; + 8< + 8= + 8> + 8 ∗ 8 = ?
1
1 + 0.9 + 0.8 + 0.3 + 0 + 0C ∗ 80
= 26.67 
 
	;9 = ;9;9 + ;8 + ;< + ;= + ;> + ; ∗ ; = ?
0.9
0.9 + 0.9 + 0.7 + 0 + 0 + 0C ∗ 80
= 28.80 
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0.4 + 0.8 + 0.7 + 0 + 0 + 0C ∗ 80
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H = 	89 + 	;9 + 	<9 + 	=9 + 	>9 + 	9 = 26.67 + 28.80 + 16.84 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 72.31 
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1
 See the seminal works of Bourdieu (1986) on the interaction between social capital and cultural capital and of 
Coleman (1988) on the interaction between social capital and human capital. 
2
 Knack and Keefer (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Zak and Knack (2001), and Meon and Sekkat (2015) 
assess the relationship between social capital and economic growth. 
3
 Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) categorize these different dimensions into three categories: structural social 
capital (the presence or absence of relationships between individuals, the configuration of their networks, and the 
standard of connections; e.g., network connectivity and density), relational social capital (type of relationship 
developed through past social interactions; e.g., respect, acceptance, friendship, sociability, prestige), and 
cognitive social capital (e.g., shared values and beliefs, common visions, or common systems of meaning). 
4
 See Adler and Kwon (2002) for a synthesis of various social capital definitions provided by sociologists. 
5
 Soft information refers to information that is difficult or even impossible to summarize in a numeric score, and 
therefore impossible to verify ex post (Petersen, 2004). 
6
 Literature has acknowledged the asymmetrical nature of the strength of dyadic ties. Although researchers who 
model informal risk insurance arrangements (e.g., Genicot and Ray, 2003; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007; 
Grandjean, 2014) assume symmetrical strength of dyadic ties for the sake of simplicity, they acknowledge the 
limitations of the symmetry assumption and indicate that, in reality, ties may be asymmetrical. 
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7
 This is necessary to keep the focus on the purpose of the numerical example, which is to show that different 
network configurations lead to asymmetrical social interactions. To do so, we need to hold constant all other 
variables, including the amount of redistributable resources. Access to external sources of financing would 
unnecessarily increase the complexity of the discussion by introducing another set of dimensions related to how 
the redistributable resources of some individuals would vary when they have the possibility of borrowing and 
considering how much they can borrow. 
8
 Again, a detailed discussion of the numerical application is available in Annex 1. 
9
 The numerical application in this section can be replicated with the social capital simulator available at 
http://luminita.postelnicu.net/SocialCapitalSimulator/informal_risk_insurance.html. This simulator has a wider 
application than the discussion in this paper. In particular, various communities can be designed, and any number 
of scenarios for network dynamic formation strategies can be analyzed and compared. 
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